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Managing the Accountability-Autonomy Tensions in University 
Research Commercialisation 
 
Abstract 
  
This paper investigates organisational responses to emerging concerns about how 
accountability-autonomy tensions can be managed within the context of university research 
commercialisation. The findings suggest that changed expectations of university research 
practices, which result from the introduction of a commercialisation logic, can be managed via 
the homogenisation of research goals and strategies. The successful management of 
accountability-autonomy tensions also depends on utilising the various structures and cultural 
contexts that can be facilitated by decoupling and bridging strategies. Further, while adopting 
symbolic systems may enhance legitimacy, failure to implement material practices and provide 
the appropriate cultural context to manage conflicting relationships may put university 
commercialisation ambitions at risk. 
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Managing the Accountability-Autonomy Tensions in University 
Research Commercialisation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As research and its commercialisation have increasingly impacted on economies and societies, 
demands for accountability and relevance in university research have grown. In addition to 
teaching and research, universities have a new mission to achieve knowledge transfer and the 
commercialisation of research results (Nelles and Vorley, 2010). Research commercialisation 
is defined as “the transformation of basic knowledge into marketable new products and 
services” thereby contributing to improved economic and social outcomes (Laperche, 2002, p. 
150). It reflects the logic of market forces, with a shift in the focus of academic research 
towards revenue-seeking (Lapsley and Miller, 2004).  
The changed commercial expectations of university research give rise to accountability-
autonomy tensions that can be divisive and undermine the academic values of universities. 
Today, universities operate in an environment where economic and political interests intrude 
on their internal autonomy, research strategies are increasingly market-oriented, and the focus 
is moving towards applied, commercialised research and the management of intellectual 
property (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Salmi, 2007).  
The aim of this paper is to address an unexplored question, i.e. how do universities of varying 
histories and orientations address the management of underlying tensions between researcher 
autonomy and accountability that arise from the increasing trend towards research 
commercialisation? While extant studies point to the contextual drivers, the role of various 
stakeholders, the impacts on researchers and the outcomes for universities, little research has 
been conducted into the dynamics and challenges of managing this process. In particular, there 
has been no consideration of how universities’ differing backgrounds shape their strategies for 
managing accountability-autonomy tensions. 
 
Why is this issue important? The challenges of research commercialisation have shifted the 
research management focus from supporting autonomous individual researchers to fostering, 
managing and evaluating research teams that can produce commercialiseable knowledge. 
However, this has led to tensions between university managers and researchers as the latter 
challenge perceived intrusions into their autonomy and growing demands for research 
entrepreneurship (Salmi, 2007).  This raises questions concerning what strategies universities 
can use to diffuse these tensions, and whether the same strategies can work for universities at 
differing stages of their research and commercialisation development. 
 
4 
 
This study demonstrates that managing tensions requires accommodating commercialisation 
within the university structure in a homogeneous manner so that it does not undermine the 
scholarly research culture and values of academic freedom and autonomy that have shaped 
research within universities (Deem, 2004). It will also reveal the complexities of strategising 
and managing the commercialisation process, particularly regarding the crucial task of dealing 
with competing external and internal logics. Structures and processes of bridging, buffering 
and decoupling will all be shown to play potential roles in managing accountability-autonomy 
tensions.   
 
Using case studies of two New Zealand universities engaged in research commercialisation, 
we investigate the related accountability-autonomy tensions and propose ways to manage them. 
The next section reviews relevant literature on the challenges of research commercialisation to 
explain the underlying tensions between researcher autonomy and accountability.  We then 
describe our theoretical framework and research method and present our findings and 
discussion. Finally, we develop conclusions and implications for future research. 
 
 
THE CHALLENGES OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 
COMMERCIALISATION 
 
With diminishing government funding, universities have been conditioned towards an 
increasing degree of self-financing (Parker, 2013). To this end, governments have prompted 
universities to reshape their research orientations and structures by partnering with private 
sector corporations, seeking grants from external funding bodies, patenting discoveries, 
providing research-based corporate advisory services and of course commercialising research 
outputs, perhaps by creating spinoff companies (Parker, 2012; Soley, 1995). Extracting 
financial revenues for and from research has become a new performance benchmark for 
assessing researcher success (Parker and Guthrie, 2005; Washburn, 2005). Hence, university 
research projects and teams have developed a greater emphasis on serving the private rather 
than public interest, as commercial revenues are assiduously pursued and the financial interests 
of universities and their private sector partners dominate research strategies (Washburn, 2005). 
University researchers in turn become reconfigured as research entrepreneurs (Gendron, 2008; 
Soley, 1995). 
 
Commercialisation of university research became prominent with the passage of the 1980 
Bayh-Dole Act in the USA, which gave universities the incentive to patent inventions resulting 
from publicly funded research (Decter et al., 2007). From the mid-1990s, many OECD nations 
followed the USA example by granting intellectual property ownership rights to universities to 
encourage research commercialisation to supplement their public research funding with private 
funding (OECD, 2003). This has transformed universities into hybrid organisations (Parker, 
2012), often being public sector situated but expected to pursue commercial imperatives.  
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The pressure for commercialisation has added a new dimension to the research management 
practices of many universities. The boundaries between basic and applied research are being 
actively contested and redefined in terms of how research advances social and economic 
development (Calvert, 2006) and it is claimed that individual and institutional research 
autonomy has deteriorated due to a more commercialised research environment and increased 
accountability requirements (Kayrooz et al., 2007). In this new climate, universities are 
confronted with a complex research and development process that requires managing the 
competing interests of stakeholders involved in exploring and exploiting knowledge (Hardy, 
1991).  
 
While it has been argued that organisations must excel at both exploitative and exploratory 
innovation in order to survive and prosper (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996), the considerable 
tensions between these two activities can present a management challenge (Andriopoulos and 
Lewis, 2009).  Exploratory or ‘basic’ research1 is undertaken primarily to acquire knowledge 
and promote learning and may be seen as an end in itself, whereas exploitation activities have 
commercialisation in mind. Further, individual researchers tend to be incentivised by the 
academic value of knowledge, while government and commercial partners are focused on the 
exploitation value of research (Deem, 2004; Henkel, 2005). These two faces of research have 
fundamentally different logics and require different management strategies and structures 
(Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). Indeed, Parker (2011, p. 445) notes: 
 
“traditional curiosity-driven, fundamental and critical research sits in increasingly 
uncomfortable juxtaposition with the newer industry oriented applied research 
agenda...with funding driven compliance being increasingly the order of the day. 
Increasingly the funded, short term, applied research orientation is being absorbed and 
internalised by universities and their academics”. 
 
Accountability Demands 
 
Research commercialisation has not only changed perceptions about the relevance and 
economic significance of academic research, it has increased accountability demands on 
universities (OECD, 2005). Many governments are now attaching greater strategic priority to 
research quality, emphasising a shift in research outcomes towards pathways for innovation 
and technology development (Henkel, 2005) and linking funding to performance-based 
measures (OECD, 2005; Parker, 2013). Measures of research performance are also in flux (ter 
Bogt and Scapens, 2012). As Gibbons et al. (1994, p. 3) note, the ascension of research that is 
intended to be useful to industry, government and/or society (i.e. more likely to be of 
commercial value) requires that measures of market competitiveness and cost effectiveness 
must stand alongside traditional assessments of academic rigour. At the same time, government 
                                                 
1 The literature uses various terms such as basic, fundamental, academic, scholarly and exploratory research. 
The term ‘basic research’ is used here to represent these similar ideas.  
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funding for basic research has declined, meaning that universities must acquire research 
funding through other sources (Parker, 2012; 2013).  
 
As a result of these developments, a managerial culture has increasingly informed the re-
prioritised research agenda (Henkel, 2005; Parker, 2013; Pettersen and Solstad, 2007) and 
accountability has become a powerful force in reflecting the concerns of wider stakeholders to 
realise the exploitation potential of university research (Altbach, 2007). Hence, accountability 
demands now place high value on what can be observed and measured from research 
(Yamamoto, 2004).  
Autonomy Tensions 
 
Increased accountability demands around research have given rise to tensions at both 
organisational and individual levels, with claims that demands for accountability have 
diminished researchers’ autonomy (Altbach, 2007; Calvert, 2006; Kayrooz et al., 2007). Others 
have highlighted the risk that research commercialisation and its associated measurement and 
management systems will damage research innovation and creativity (ter Bogt and Scapens, 
2012) and jeopardise the central mission and role of the university (Lee, 1996). 
 
It has been argued that the logic of academic research aimed at advancing knowledge is 
fundamentally different to, and often incompatible with, the logic of commercial research 
aimed at generating revenues (D'Este and Patel, 2007; Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; 
Pettersen and Solstad, 2007). While in theory there seems to be “no necessary incompatibility 
between being both highly autonomous and rigorously accountable”, in practice “where more 
accountability is required, less autonomy remains” (Berdahl, 1990, p. 171). Within a research 
commercialisation context, it seems that achieving a ‘balance’ between the professional 
autonomy of the researcher and appropriate accountability depends on how universities 
organise and manage themselves (Yamamoto, 2004). This is the focus of the study reported 
here. 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
New institutional sociology (NIS) provides useful perspectives for understanding why and how 
organisations adopt strategies, structures and processes to conform to the pressures of the 
institutional environment (Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006; Suddaby, 2010). Its organisational view 
helps the “overall outcomes of university corporatisation and commercialisation become more 
transparent” (Parker, 2011, p. 445).  
With its roots in the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977), DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Scott (1987) and Oliver (1991), NIS has been used to theorise studies of accountability 
and management (e.g., Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Ezzamel et al., 2007). NIS characterises 
the institutional environment as the manifestation of institutionalised societal beliefs, rules, 
myths, norms and accepted practices to which organisations must conform if they are to secure 
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needed resources and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2003). It is a collective 
creation of powerful actors who shape how organisational interests are determined and pursued. 
The institutional environment exerts homogenising influences via: coercive pressure (e.g. from 
political and regulatory requirements); mimetic pressure (organizations copy others they 
perceive to be more legitimate or successful); and normative pressure (e.g. from professional 
networks) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2003). Identifying these pressures, and how 
they influence universities’ research commercialisation agenda, can offer insights into the 
management of accountability-autonomy tensions.   
At the organisational level, competing institutional demands originate from the competing 
logics of heterogeneous organizational fields (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). These multiple 
‘institutional logics’ cause practice variation as actors respond strategically to institutional 
pressures (Lounsbury, 2008; Oliver, 1991). Institutional logics are “socially constructed, 
historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material substance, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). They provide 
organisational actors with shared understandings of what goals to pursue and how to pursue 
them (Scott, 1987) and organising principles to guide social action (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008).  Conflicting institutional demands may be resolved by the progressive assimilation of 
challenging logics (Hoffman, 1999) or, in fragmented fields when no institutional constituent 
clearly dominates, conflicting demands may remain unresolved (Pache and Santos, 2010). 
Under such conditions organisations display varying degrees of choice, awareness, pro-
activeness, influence and self-interest in response to institutional pressures for change 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Oliver, 1991). Hence, attention to institutional logics may 
help in understanding organisational-level responses to universities’ research accountability-
autonomy tensions. 
NIS theory also suggests that organisations can pursue legitimation from their institutional 
environment while simultaneously protecting their technical environment (Scott, 2003). For 
example, ‘bridging strategies’ involve adaptation techniques such as networks, contracting and 
- common in the university context - collaborations. By managing differing interests, they can 
change institutional logics in ways that are acceptable to all parties (Gray, 2000). The use of 
such bridging strategies may therefore offer a useful compromise in managing research 
accountability-autonomy tensions.  
Alternatively, ‘buffering strategies’ may be used in an attempt to reduce external pressures by 
partially detaching or decoupling activities from external contact (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2003). 
Faced with competing institutional demands, organisations may decouple their formal structure 
and operational structures, or symbolically adopt the structures or practices demanded by 
institutional referents to project a legitimate image (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Scott, 
2003). Several studies identify the use of decoupling strategies to protect organisational 
interests, especially regarding maintaining autonomy and maximising efficiency without the 
need for external intervention or public scrutiny (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Covaleski 
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and Dirsmith, 1988). Such strategies could potentially be employed to defend researcher 
autonomy. 
Other studies point to “ambidextrous” organisational configurations, with dual strategies and 
structures aimed at simultaneously managing competing logics. Approaches may include 
‘differentiation’ tactics emphasising structural ambidexterity to help maintain different 
competencies to address competing demands (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) or ‘integration’ 
tactics emphasising contextual ambidexterity, which is the capacity of organisations to align 
activities to common goals while adapting to changing demands in the task environment 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Contextual ambidexterity is 
achieved by creating systems that enable and encourage individuals to make their own 
judgements about how to allocate their time across conflicting demands (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). So when confronted with conflicting 
institutional demands, organisations will find ways to implement logics acceptable to all key 
institutional constituents. Such strategies may be observable in universities’ responses to the 
competing logics of research and commercialisation. 
Recent theoretical debate has identified avenues for extending NIS. One concerns a greater 
appreciation of the role of agents in shaping how and why organisations respond to institutional 
pressures, thus explaining diverse responses within seemingly similar institutional 
environments (Lounsbury, 2008; Moll et al., 2006). This can offer insights into how individuals 
and groups interpret institutional pressures and respond to stabilise or reshape organisational 
structures. However, researchers using NIS have been cautioned against focusing on the agency 
of isolated “heroic actors” at the expense of contextualising a case study within the interplay 
of multiple actors and their everyday organisational work (Suddaby et al., 2010, p. 1237). 
Cognisant of this, we employ “a model of agency in which power is more distributed or 
embedded in larger social networks or structures” (Suddaby et al., 2010, p. 1237). Rather than 
seeking to trace the agency of individuals, we incorporate the perspectives of key sets of actors 
(university managers and researchers) who have the capacity to influence organisational norms, 
values and structures.  
A further NIS extension involves “institutional work” – i.e. “the practices of individuals and 
collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence et al., 
2011, p. 52).  As Suddaby (2010, p. 15) notes, these day-to-day practices are often aimed at 
maintaining stability or “at least the appearance of stability” in the face of pressures for change. 
Also, NIS’s institutional focus can be complemented with a more “micro” view of 
organisational processes (Moll et al., 2006, p. 188; Suddaby, 2010).  For example, Ribeiro and 
Scapens (2006) note that organisational level analyses must also surface the conflicts and 
power distributions that lie within the ‘black box’ of the organisation. Hence, our 
organisational-level analysis incorporates the perspectives of university managers and 
researchers in order to understand how organisational strategies and structures respond to 
institutional pressures.  
Finally, there have been calls to pay greater attention to the influences of history, context and 
values when using NIS. For example, Suddaby et al. (2010, p. 1238) note that organisational 
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context is “shaped by prior and local institutionalized patterns that relevant stakeholders can 
support, change, or use to further their interests” and that values are a key determinant of 
organisational change processes. Similarly, Battilana and Dorado (2010) note that attention to 
context is important in understanding organisational responses to competing institutional 
logics.  Such attention may help in responding to Lounsbury’s (2008) call to use NIS to study 
organisational heterogeneity and practice variations. To highlight the effects of context, we use 
NIS to theorise two case organisations whose differing types, histories and values may shape 
their responses to identical institutional pressure towards research commercialisation. 
In sum, while NIS offers an appropriate theoretical lens for our predominantly organisational-
level analysis, its recent developments also accommodate the consideration of how local, intra-
organisational agency shapes responses to institutional pressures. Indeed, several prior 
accounting studies illustrate the use of NIS in conjunction with a consideration of the active 
role of individuals and groups (e.g., Ezzamel et al., 2007). Hence, the elements of NIS theory 
combine to provide a framework for analysing how organisational strategies may assist 
universities to manage accountability-autonomy tensions arising around research 
commercialisation. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This study was carried out via case studies of two universities. This method allowed an in-
depth examination of accountability-autonomy tensions within the situated context of 
university research and commercialisation practice. It also facilitated comparisons to provide 
robust and reliable results (Yin, 2009). 
 
Data for this study was derived from archival material and semi-structured interviews. The 
archival data comprised the two case universities’ strategic documents (charters, profiles, 
strategic and investment plans), annual reports, newsletters and website information over eight 
years (2002-2012). Information was also gathered from other secondary sources such as 
government reports and statements of strategic research priorities, and publications relating to 
national, international and university-specific research issues. Accessing archival data enabled 
an understanding of strategies, structures, processes and actions over time, thus providing a 
basis for data triangulation against ex-post interviews. The 2002-2012 period captured a time 
when universities’ research management practices were under pressure to adapt towards 
commercialisation and accountability-autonomy tensions became exacerbated by reduced 
government funding. 
  
To understand how the tensions between researcher autonomy and accountability were 
perceived and managed, interviews were conducted with researchers, research institute and 
centre directors, commercialisation company chief executive officers and commercialisation 
company directors at the two universities. Interviews were also conducted with senior 
university staff and senior government policy and funding advisors. Their inclusion provided 
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a broader understanding of universities’ research management and accountability obligations. 
In total 28 interviews were conducted from December 2007 to June 20092.  
 
Each interview lasted one to one-and-a-half hours. Interviews were tape recorded, transcribed 
and saved as word files. Qualitative analysis software NVivo 8 was used to assist the coding 
process. Interview data and archival data were analysed in parallel to allow common patterns 
and themes to emerge, and to ensure appropriate data triangulation (Patton, 1990). Preliminary 
findings from the two cases were also compared to identify commonalities and divergences in 
their patterns and themes. The results of the data analysis are presented in the findings section, 
but first the research setting is outlined as context for this study.  
 
THE RESEARCH SETTING 
“Premier” and “Universal”3 are the two New Zealand universities used as case studies. Premier 
is one of New Zealand’s largest universities in terms of student enrolments and staff employed.  
Established over 100 years ago, Premier has a reputation as a research-intensive university. Its 
strategic documents state a commitment to excellence in all aspects of research endeavours 
from fundamental research, to innovation and applied/developmental research, through to 
commercialisation of research and intellectual property (Profile 2008; Charter, 2003). Premier 
has been involved with research commercialisation for nearly thirty years, making it one of the 
earliest universities in New Zealand to engage in such activity. It established a large 
commercialisation company that protects and commercialises the university’s intellectual 
property, runs its contract research activities, and supports an increasing number of 
commercially-focused, specialist research centres. 
 
Universal is a fast growing, newer university that emerged from a teaching-centred culture. It 
describes itself as a “university for the changing world…stimulated by research that advances 
intellectual debate, discovery and change” (Investment Plan, 2015-2017). Over the past 
decade, it has undergone change aimed at strengthening its research and its strategic plans have 
emphasised fostering research that benefits practice and the social and economic advancement 
of the nation. Universal is relatively new to research commercialisation, having only engaged 
in these activities since the early 2000s. In recent years Universal has made a significant 
commitment to developing and commercialising its research and intellectual property, placing 
great importance on its stakeholders to influence and guide its commercialisation activities. 
Consistent with NIS’s recognition of the importance of organisational contexts reflecting local 
histories, values and patterns (Lounsbury, 2008; Suddaby et al., 2010) the research 
commercialisation contexts of the two case study universities and their approaches to managing 
accountability-autonomy tensions are described next. 
 
                                                 
2 Further details of the interviews and documents analysed are available from this journal’s editorial office. 
3 Names are disguised to preserve anonymity. 
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 THE PREMIER UNIVERSITY CASE 
 
Pressures for research and commercialisation at Premier originated from numerous sources 
including: the institutional demands of the global knowledge-based economy; coercive 
pressure via government research funding; normative demands from research professionals and 
industry; and the growing influence of the marketization of higher education. From an NIS 
perspective, these global, national and local contextual elements shaped Premier’s responses 
and organisational processes. Thus Premier adopted a strategy: 
 
...to undertake high quality research which contributes to social, economic, 
environmental and cultural development; ... to attract, encourage and retain the 
best possible researchers; and to provide the appropriate infrastructure and 
resources to support research.” (Premier Strategic Plan, 2005-2012) 
 
Premier’s strategic documents identified its key research stakeholders and potential sources of 
institutional logics as business and industry, staff and students (the researchers), the wider 
community, government, and some leading international research collaborators. They also 
specified that Premier’s accountability relationship with its stakeholders related to the 
advancement of research projects, the enhancement of intellectual development, gaining peer 
and professional recognition, and producing high quality research. Government, a key 
stakeholder, provided core funding and in return held Premier accountable for producing 
research outputs that help drive the nation’s social and economic goals.  
 
At the same time, a reduction in government research funding forced Premier to seek 
alternative funding to develop its research capability. Consequently, research 
commercialisation has become an important means of providing both the opportunity and funds 
to develop research capability. From an NIS perspective, Premier exhibited the beginnings of 
contextual ambidexterity in creating new systems to adapt to changing task environment 
demands. This university “is systematically seeking to identify opportunities for new, 
profitable, commercial activities” (CEC-P). Thus, securing alternative funding sources 
represents Premier’s attempt to shape its own context as a means of managing the coercive 
pressures of government funding reductions, partly through achieving ambidexterity in 
developing multiple responses aimed at maintaining research funding and momentum 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Suddaby et al., 2010). In line with international trends, the 
move towards research commercialisation portrays Premier as a modern and innovative 
university. As Premier’s Director of Commercialisation noted:  
 
“... the greater the number of projects that get commercialised, your international 
reputation as a university grows ... that then flows into attracting other top-flight 
academics, then that flows into … attracting top postgraduate students ... So, it’s 
one after the other, you grow your reputation.” (DRC-P)4  
 
                                                 
4 See the Appendix for the interviewee codes. 
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Alongside external stakeholders’ increased demands have sat those of Premier’s researchers 
who expect to enjoy considerable professional autonomy in developing an enterprising research 
culture necessary for commercialisation. These expectations derived from Premier’s Strategic 
Plan 2005-2012, which advocated that staff “…conduct research in a manner which meets the 
needs of external parties while at the same time adhering to the principles of academic freedom 
and institutional autonomy”. In this sense, Premier has attempted to manage multiple 
institutional logics introduced by different groups of external stakeholders through assimilating 
their requirements into its research commercialisation strategies. 
Premier, like many contemporary universities, is caught between scholarly values and those 
represented by commercialisation. Senior managers recognised that researcher autonomy is 
necessary to encourage the development of research programmes. Thus, Premier became 
contextually ambidextrous (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996) by 
maintaining systems that allowed key organisational groups to manage opposing objectives by 
making their own decisions about how to allocate their research time.  Premier also recognised 
that its fiscal survival depended on funding from research commercialisation and related 
financial accountability. The tension between these two value sets was managed via two major 
strategies: strategic planning and management structures. Here we see management attempting 
to create an internal organisational environment that facilitates multiple institutional logics 
through compromise between researchers’ and management’s goals.  
 
A Strategic Planning Approach 
 
Coercive and mimetic pressures arising from funding and accountability requirements 
compelled Premier to adopt strategic research goals that were aligned with government 
research and funding priorities. Accordingly, Premier’s strategy documents noted the 
university’s reliance on external funding (Premier Profile, 2008) with its Strategic Plan 2005-
2012 endorsing the provisions of the Education Act 1989 sections 161(2) (b), which protects 
“the freedom of academic staff and students to engage in research”, and 161(1), which requires 
“academic freedom and the autonomy of institutions to be preserved and enhanced”. This 
reflected Premier’s employment of contextual ambidexterity to alleviate autonomy tensions. In 
accommodating the need for external resources and legitimacy, as well as  academic freedom, 
formal strategy documents served as bridging mechanisms that enabled the alignment of the 
“University’s Strategic Plan consistent with the priorities of the Tertiary Education Strategy 
(TES) 2007-2012” (Premier Profile, 2008).   
 
Rewards, incentives, rules and sanctions are important institutional elements that motivate or 
regulate organisational behaviour (Scott, 2003; Lam, 2011). Premier’s researchers were 
primarily motivated by publications as a measure of their performance, and usually had no 
immediate commercialisation plans. Moving towards research commercialisation was 
considered contrary to their best interests as academics. Frustration was expressed that “the 
signals from publication-based research measures drive the university culture to a large extent 
and do not reward and recognise commercial outcomes” (CEC-P). At the same time, some 
researchers felt that funding metrics constrained researcher autonomy by channelling efforts 
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into areas that attracted external funding rather than supporting long-term, experimental 
research.  Thus the researchers, as a key actor group, felt threatened by these coercive, 
government-triggered pressures and experienced competing logics that produced unresolved 
tensions for their roles and futures (Lawrence et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010). 
 
In an attempt to manage these tensions, Premier’s strategy was to “maintain an appropriate 
balance between ‘blue skies’, ‘strategic’, and ‘applied’ research, with strong links to the 
academic community (national and international) and ‘end users’ within its communities of 
interest” (Premier Profile, 2008). Hence, Premier’s strategic plan ‘buffered’ the university 
from external pressures through a process of separation (Etzkowitz, 2003), that is, setting up 
research boundaries or structures to develop research groups that did not conflict with 
commercialisation interests. It also ‘bridged’ different research perspectives through a process 
of integrating interests and managing competing logics (Etzkowitz, 2003; Boxenbaum and 
Jonsson, 2008; Huxham and Hibbert, 2008), i.e. framing basic research ideals in economically 
and socially responsible terms to facilitate research collaboration towards commercialisation.  
  
Management Structures 
 
In an attempt to balance researcher autonomy with accountability demands, Premier placed 
strategic importance “on building high-performance research groups operating in key 
research areas in each of the broad disciplines undertaken by the University” (Premier Profile, 
2008-2010).  It established two research institutes as structurally ‘ambidextrous’ organisations 
to build research capability and develop projects for commercialisation (Andriopoulos and 
Lewis, 2009; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Both institutes had autonomous management 
structures and budgets that decoupled them from Premier’s academic units, and their funding 
was derived mainly from external sources. These institutes also served as bridging mechanisms 
by promoting commercialisation-supporting collaborations between researchers (Gray, 2000; 
Huxham and Hibbert, 2008).  
 
In addition to its two large research institutes, Premier had eight small, multi-disciplinary 
research institutes and almost forty small research centres hosted by faculties and schools that 
provided infrastructure support. Researchers operating under these management structures had 
autonomy to set their research agenda, manage their projects and budgets, engage in 
institutional work and establish collaborations. In return, they were accountable for developing 
basic research to support the university’s mission. The research institutes and centres enabled 
Premier to develop research capability through the collaborative efforts of multi-disciplinary 
researchers “thinking institutionally” to uphold the institution of a university and what it stands 
for (Helco, 2008 cited in Lawrence et al., 2011; p. 54). Not only were researchers concerned to 
maintain the institution via their institutional work, they acknowledged the need to re-create it 
as modern and responsive to commercialisation imperatives. For example, one researcher 
emphasised that “we can’t afford just to be doing blue sky research...we can get more value by 
also looking at commercialisation” (RS-1).  Thus, Premier had to some degree shaped its 
interpretive mechanisms for conditioning how its academic groups would respond to 
government imperatives and facilitated the development of shared institutional logics that 
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assisted researchers and managers to pursue shared objectives (Suddaby et al, 2010; Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999). 
 
Premier’s research institutes and centres were used as bridging mechanisms, facilitating new 
collaborations as well as the pursuit of commercialisation goals. While institutes and centres 
had autonomy, their funding was performance-based and Premier was responsible for 
discharging accountability consistent with the research priorities of its funders. In sum, the 
management structures created around research institutes and centres promoted collaboration 
and the development of shared institutional logics that bridged managers’ and researchers’ self-
interests (Gray, 2000; Reay and Hinings, 2009). 
 
Premier also sought to manage research accountability-autonomy tensions by forming a 
wholly-owned, autonomous commercialisation company that was decoupled from the 
university structure. It was “set us up as a separate business unit so we could act as a 
commercial entity, and de-politicise decisions” (CEC-P). The commercial company could be 
seen as a further bridging mechanism, fostering collaborations between researchers (Huxham 
and Hibbert, 2008) and facilitating partnerships with research institutes and centres. However, 
it also served as an important buffering or decoupling mechanism to minimise the conflict 
between basic research values and the logic of commercialisation (Scott, 2003).  According to 
Premier’s CEO of Commercialisation, its outcomes were not achievable under the university 
structure, largely due to the influence of university politics. He noted: “I cannot emphasise this 
enough. It is very convenient sometimes to constrain behaviour according to other prerogatives 
that exist in the university” (CEC-P).  
 
To balance autonomy with accountability, the commercial company maintained structural and 
contextual ambidexterity via its own governance and management structures, financial 
management, and intellectual property development. Despite this autonomy, the company 
remained accountable to Premier for the achievement of its objectives and performance 
measures. Also, its strategic plan was aligned with Premier’s strategic goals “... so we don’t 
actually run in a different direction to the university” (DRC-P). Still, Premier undertook annual 
reporting of research activities based around its negotiated strategic objectives funded by 
government. Thus, Premier’s buffering strategies included it symbolically projecting a 
legitimate image to government and other funders (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). 
  
Managing Accountability-Autonomy Tensions 
 
The structures and strategies outlined above demonstrate Premier’s awareness of the 
accountability-autonomy tensions around research commercialisation. The university used 
formal strategic plans, incorporating buffering or decoupling and bridging strategies, to manage 
these tensions and also established ambidextrous research institutes and centres decoupled from 
academic departments. These management structures protected researcher autonomy while 
also encouraging researchers to think institutionally to build capability and foster research 
commercialisation. Further, Premier established an independent company to undertake 
commercialisation activities, thus ensuring that basic research values did not come into conflict 
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with research commercialisation goals. Bridging strategies, in the form of collaborations 
between institutes, centres and the commercial company, facilitated the complementarities 
between basic research and commercialisation. Through these mechanisms, Premier supported 
the development of complementary institutional logics that managed the competing pressures 
and agendas to which both researchers and management were exposed.  
  
 
THE UNIVERSAL UNIVERSITY CASE 
 
Like Premier, Universal faced homogenising pressure for research and commercialisation from 
the institutional environment. There was regulative and coercive pressure from government’s 
research policies and funding mechanisms to develop research quality and capability to meet 
national social and economic development goals. There was also normative pressure from 
research peers and industry to create value from research and transfer knowledge for societal 
benefit (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2003). Universal’s strategic documents identified 
the key stakeholders to whom it was accountable for research and commercialisation 
(Universal Strategic Plan 2007-2011). Universal’s Director of Planning noted: “...we serve a 
big regional population, a national population and an international community and within that 
there are lots of varying interests” (DRP-U).  
 
Like Premier, in response to global, national and local institutional and accountability 
pressures, Universal adopted strategies to:  
 
“...develop [its] research reputation ... capability and capacity... provide opportunities 
for staff to engage in research... [and] work with businesses and the professions [and] 
... communities to conduct research that is relevant to the social and economic 
development of New Zealand and is of an international standard [and]... will provide 
opportunities for commercialising research.”  
 (Universal Strategic Plan, 2007-2011) 
 
However, tensions between researcher autonomy and accountability were apparent. 
Universal’s General Manager and Finance Director noted: “We are a university that is very 
heavily dependent on government and student funding, and it would be really nice to have an 
alternative” (GMF-U). So Universal’s strategic plans imposed accountability obligations on 
researchers to produce quality research that met the university’s funding goals and also 
provided innovative solutions to industry problems. Accordingly it targeted research 
contributing to national social and economic development goals (Universal Investment Plan, 
2008-2011). From an NIS perspective, management prioritised the externally-imposed 
research commercialisation logic and imposed it upon academic staff goals and research values. 
 
However, Universal researchers noted: “...the moment people start interfering is the day that I 
disappear” (RPS-U).They also believed that autonomy was necessary in developing an 
enterprising research culture that could lead to commercialisation outcomes. As one Research 
Institute Director (also a researcher) noted:  
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“The university is smart enough to know that a person like me will not stand for 
interference. If you give me the field I will run it ……. . They will get high profile, they 
get money, they get research outputs, if they let me run it.” (ID3-U) 
  
Thus, researchers’ and management’s responses to external coercive pressures differed 
markedly, with resulting internal conflicts threatening to derail institutional performance and 
responsive management of government pressures (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Suddaby et al., 
2010). Thus, internal actors felt that management was not providing systems that would assist 
them to adapt to the changing task environment. That is, contextual ambidexterity was missing.  
 
Strategising Tension Management 
 
Initially, Universal established research commercialisation as a separate activity, with 
ambitious goals decoupled from basic research priorities. However, its 2005 and 2006 annual 
reports indicate that this decoupling strategy failed to achieve commercialisation objectives. 
Universal’s senior management soon realised that “fundamental differences between an 
academic approach to things and the commercial approach” caused a “clash of culture” 
(CMG-U). A high profile researcher confirmed this view, admitting that many researchers are 
only interested in basic research since it is viewed as “…the only game that is going to reward 
us” (RS1-U).  
 
To manage this tension from conflicting institutional logics (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), Universal used its formal strategic plans as a bridging mechanism 
to align basic research and commercialisation goals (Reay and Hinings, 2009), in the hope that 
“... success in increasing research activity will result, inter alia, in a research-rich environment 
for learning and teaching, an improved Performance-Based Research Funding5 (PBRF) 
rating, increased consultancy contracts and more commercialisation of intellectual property” 
(Universal Strategic Plan, 2007-2011). Ultimately, the financial rewards from 
commercialisation were seen as providing valuable resources to support researchers’ quest for 
reputational and career rewards (Lam, 2011).    
 
Universal experienced considerable coercive and mimetic funding and accountability pressures 
to adopt research goals that aligned with government’s strategic research priorities. There was 
also normative pressure from industry and researchers (Scott, 2003) to enhance Universal’s 
reputation for applied research. Universal used formal strategic plans to frame the scholarly 
ideals of research within economically and socially responsible terms by committing to 
“....work with businesses and the professions we serve to assist the development of leading 
practice [and]... conduct research that is relevant to the social and economic development of 
New Zealand ...” (Universal Strategic Plan 2007-2011). These strategic priorities placed new 
emphasis on developing basic research capability, from which commercialisation was expected 
to emerge. 
                                                 
5 New Zealand universities are subject to a government research rating and funding exercise (the “PBRF”), 
which emphasises the quality of publications produced. 
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By drawing links between the goals of researchers (‘strengthening the University’s research 
culture and capability’) and those of research commercialisation (‘more commercialisation of 
intellectual property’), the strategic plan became an effective bridging mechanism to align 
Universal’s research goals with government and industry priorities. Unlike Premier, Universal 
attempted to buffer external pressures by decoupling internal research activities from 
government research agendas (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2003). Subsequently, it abandoned 
decoupling and changed its strategy towards bridging competing research and 
commercialisation logics by promoting an institutional logic around becoming an industry-
linked, enterprising institution.  
 
A Structural Approach 
 
Universal relied on its management and organisational structures as mechanisms to bridge the 
tension between research values and commercialisation goals (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; 
Scott, 2003). It reviewed its management structures to ensure they supported the development 
of both research and commercialisation. It also established smaller research centres within 
schools and faculties, which grew into fourteen large research institutes. Commenting on the 
autonomy of the research institutes, one Institute Director remarked “it’s a hell of a lot of 
institutes to be popping up ...everybody had the freedom to do whatever they wanted” (ID1-
U).  
 
However, interviews revealed that research institutes with external funding gave researchers 
far greater autonomy to manage research projects and budgets. Unlike Premier, Universal did 
not have highly developed research management structures, or research institutes with 
autonomy from academic departments. Universal’s research institutes were more akin to 
Premier’s school/department-based research centres. However, many researchers felt that the 
structure of Universal’s research institutes still offered autonomy. One research institute, 
whose stated mission was “to create, develop and commercialise innovative IT products”, 
emphasised autonomy by stating that their objective was to “conduct fundamental research 
and publish results in top journals…”. At the same time it declared that “our mission statement 
is also intended to reflect strongly our desire that our research will not be ivory-towered”. 
Thus, Universal supported the development of complementary institutional logics through 
structurally facilitated research practice variation aimed at preserving both agendas 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Pache and Santos, 2010). 
 
The research institutes also served as bridging mechanisms (Gray, 2000) between basic and 
applied research by providing management structures, research facilities and financial 
resources to promote researcher collaboration and develop areas of research excellence. For 
applied researchers, the institutes helped to build industry linkages that supported 
commercialisation and provided legitimacy to help secure funding and build the university’s 
research profile.   
 
Universal in 2004 established a commercial company and a research commercialisation office 
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intended to facilitate intellectual property management. Initially, research commercialisation 
was decoupled from university research activity, but in 2008, to ease tensions arising from a 
clash of cultures, the commercialisation office was integrated into the central research office. 
However, any reduction in tension can be attributed to Universal recognising the 
complementarity between basic research and commercialisation, even though it achieved 
limited success in producing commercial outputs. Thus, both management and academic 
groups produced collective responses to institutional pressures via structures designed to 
produce shared understandings of the organisation’s strategic direction (Lawrence et al, 2011; 
Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). Thus, Universal attempted to adapt to its external environment 
while protecting its existing internal technical and processual environment. 
 
Universal’s 2006 Annual Report stated that the merger of administrative divisions supporting 
research and commercialisation aimed “to ensure that emphasis is not only on 
commercialisation, but also on the contribution of commercialisation to the support and 
development of research capacity at the university”. This suggests that commercialisation was 
integrated with scholarly research so the two could become complementary. However, 
interviewees noted that frequent changes to reporting lines and commercialisation 
responsibilities created instability within research commercialisation priorities, thus returning 
the emphasis to research performance based on government funding goals, even though “the 
problem is that performance-based research funding does not necessarily value much 
commercialisation” (RS3-U). Summing up this situation, Universal’s Finance Director 
expressed a pessimistic view of the immediate potential for commercial research outcomes, 
stating that “...one would hope something would come out of it at some point, but I can’t see 
anything major really. I think it is quite hard to make universities commercial entities anyway; 
it is not their raison d’être” (GMF-U). So while Universal attempted to respond to external 
pressures for both research commercialisation and government funding-related performance, 
the latter, being closer to historical research strategies, appeared likely to dominate the 
organisational agenda and response (Lounsbury, 2008; Suddaby et al., 2010).    
 
Universal’s commercialisation company structure was intended to function as a bridging 
mechanism between basic research and commercialisation, which would “… bring the 
technologies out of the university, package them up, so we can take the IP... and then we take 
it to investors...” (CEC-U). However, this commercialisation function relied heavily on the 
university’s management structure, policies and funding support. It also relied on highly 
developed research capability. Hence, until all these elements were in place, commercialisation 
goals posed no real threat to the scholarly values of basic research. Researchers continued to 
direct their efforts towards basic research goals that rewarded them via career advancement 
and promotion and influenced university performance ratings. 
 
Towards Tension Management 
The above findings suggest that, in attempting to manage tensions between researcher 
autonomy and accountability for commercialisation, Universal lost focus on its 
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commercialisation goals in preference for achieving basic research goals that provided 
government funding. Initially, Universal decoupled scholarly research from commercialisation 
to manage tensions, but soon realised that although they appeared to have competing logics, 
these activities were complementary. To allow both activities to coexist, Universal gave 
priority to its basic research goals from which it expected research commercialisation to 
develop. While the structures it developed protected researcher autonomy and enabled the 
pooling of resources required to build research capacity, they unintentionally reduced 
commercialisation to a marginal activity whose logic and values failed to contest those of basic 
research. 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Three dominant themes emerge from this study. First, the growing funding and accountability 
pressures on the two studied universities led to a homogenisation of their research goals and 
strategies, which in turn helped to ease accountability-autonomy tensions. Second, although 
both universities seemed to invoke similar managerial strategies regarding research 
commercialisation, the differing outcomes suggest that the effectiveness of such strategies is 
contextually shaped and that accountability-autonomy tensions may be easier to manage in 
contexts that provide highly developed research capability, structural ambidexterity, autonomy 
over resources, and commercialisation incentives. Third, the universities employed decoupling 
and bridging strategies to exploit complementarities between their basic research and 
commercialisation. Each of these themes is now elaborated. 
 
Institutional Environment Pressures and Homogenisation 
 
The organisational field of research commercialisation is increasingly shaped by pressures 
from the institutional environment. Coercive pressure is applied by governments via funding 
regimes that requires universities to comply with research performance and accountability 
measures. In our study, the government was not a “passive or disinterested” institutional entity, 
but rather was “active and engaged” in wielding power and pressuring universities towards a 
research commercialisation focus (Suddaby et al., 2010, p. 1237). For the two case universities, 
this coercive pressure compelled particular forms of homogeneity in their research conduct. To 
qualify for government funding, both universities were under pressure to mirror the 
government’s research priorities and performance metrics in the strategic and investment plans 
that signalled what their researchers ‘should’ do. So, instead of becoming ‘active resistors’ to 
institutional pressures, both universities found a way to go along with the change (and remain 
accountable) while managing the challenges to researcher autonomy.   
 
Conformity to shared norms, values and beliefs also regulated the conduct of researchers. In 
this study, normative and mimetic pressure from research peers and organisations (e.g. research 
institutes and centres) reinforced researchers’ demands for autonomy. At the same time, these 
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pressures led to a greater homogenisation of research structures and processes that helped to 
foster collegiality and collaboration. Mimetic and normative pressures within the international 
environment also promoted conformity to the growing view of research commercialisation as 
a ‘legitimate’ part of the institutional work of university researchers. The adoption of a research 
commercialisation mission can, therefore, be seen as an attempt by both universities to exert 
power via a collective agency of research networks and structures to help maintain stability as 
well as portray themselves as modern, innovative institutions to enhance their international 
research reputations.  
 
These findings support Parker’s (2011) view that institutional pressures lead to a growing 
homogenisation of university mission statements, strategic plans and operational priorities. 
Despite their different histories and profiles, Premier and Universal had similar research 
missions and goals, and their mimicking of government priorities helped the two universities 
achieve legitimacy and ongoing funding. This homogenisation, which is underpinned by shared 
beliefs and a common interpretation of institutional environment pressures, helped to ease 
researcher accountability-autonomy tensions by requiring researchers to converge towards 
common modes of institutional action and collaborative behaviour in order to access resources 
and gain legitimacy for their research.  
 
Creating Context and Ambidexterity 
 
Although both universities seemed to invoke similar strategies in dealing with research 
commercialisation, the outcomes differed. This suggests that, even though organisations 
operating in similar institutional environments may gravitate towards homogeneous structures 
and processes (Parker, 2011), the outcomes may be contextually shaped. Our two case 
universities’ responses to institutional pressures appeared to be shaped by their different values, 
histories and prior structures, and partly shaped by actors responding “locally, creatively, 
incrementally, and more or less reflexively” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 57). Hence, by 
comparing the two cases we were able to take account of the actions and processes that resulted 
from the agency of organisational actors (managers and researchers) in response to institutional 
pressures around research commercialisation, rather than focusing only on the outcomes or on 
the “dramatic actions of the heroic entrepreneur” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 57). 
 
Our findings also show the effect of contextual factors in shaping managerial strategies. 
Universal was a newer university that saw the development of research capability as its first 
priority. It used integration strategies with a focus on contextual ambidexterity to align research 
activities to its goal of capability development, from which it expected commercialisation 
opportunities to flow. In contrast, Premier was a long-established, large university with highly 
developed research capability and considerable experience of research commercialisation 
(Premier Annual Report, 2006). Premier established a company to advance research 
commercialisation, while its autonomous research institutes remained primarily focussed on 
scholarly research. This configuration reflected Premier’s reliance on differentiation strategies, 
with an emphasis on structural ambidexterity - i.e., separate organisational structures for 
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scholarly research and commercialisation – that protected researcher autonomy while also 
advancing commercialisation goals.  
 
In sum, our findings suggest that where research capability and commercialisation capacity are 
highly developed, the adoption of ambidextrous organisational configurations may help to 
manage accountability-autonomy tensions around research commercialisation. Being 
ambidextrous requires autonomy of budgets, human resources, systems and structures, as well 
as a cultural context that allows flexibility and incentives to researchers to exercise their 
judgement in pursuing basic research or commercialisation (or both). On the other hand, an 
under-developed research capability may result in commercialisation becoming a marginal 
activity because the focus is still on building research rather than seeking the next step of 
commercialisation.   
 
Decoupling and Bridging 
 
This study has identified two modes of decoupling – proactive and reactive/defensive – used 
as adaptation techniques to manage the competing logics of commercialisation and scholarly 
research and ease accountability-autonomy tensions.  
 
Premier used proactive decoupling by creating separate business processes, structures and 
cultural contexts to support the activities and risk-taking behaviours required for research 
commercialisation. Reactive decoupling was used as a defensive mechanism by Universal to 
give the appearance of accepting commercialisation logic in order to enhance its public image 
and provide legitimacy and accountability for funding. The establishment of a research 
commercialisation structure at Universal was largely symbolic since Universal’s main priority 
continued to be the development of research that met government performance metrics. 
Researchers were incentivised to pursue basic research goals that would lead to career 
advancement. Parker (2011, p. 445) claims that “government research ranking metrics are also 
becoming increasingly powerful coercive forces ..., continually reinforced by university 
management control systems that have been reoriented towards revenue generation and cost 
minimisation”. However, our findings indicate that researchers at both universities saw the 
government performance-based funding metrics as supporting their research agenda rather than 
focusing it too much on commercialisation. The two universities were strategic in their 
response to the pressures of the institutional funding environment (Oliver, 1991) and may have 
purposefully complied with funding regulations/metrics or adopted specific formal structures 
and procedures in order to gain legitimacy and secure resources.   
 
Our findings suggest that research commercialisation success may depend on extracting value 
from basic research, while commercialisation revenues could support the development of basic 
research. Further, managing accountability-autonomy tensions may require a determination to 
realise the full potential of this complementarity. The use of bridging strategies in both studied 
universities facilitated adaptive responses that helped achieve this. Both universities created 
research institutes and centres that served as effective bridging mechanisms by integrating 
internal and external research knowledge and assembling resources from across organisational 
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boundaries. Bridging strategies used by Premier – flexible collaboration, contracting, networks, 
and government and industry partnerships – helped to access diverse, novel knowledge from 
basic research and to develop research capability from which commercialisation outcomes 
could flow. By encouraging cooperation, these bridging strategies helped to identify and 
exploit the synergies of researcher collaboration.  
 
These findings suggest that managing accountability-autonomy tensions does not necessarily 
require that choices be made between the logics of basic research and commercialisation. 
Universal realised it needed to develop its research capability before it could achieve 
commercialisation success. Hence, a bridging strategy (a merger between administrative 
divisions supporting research and commercialisation) was adopted to support the assimilation 
of commercialisation logic into the basic research logic. Other bridging strategies, such as 
research collaborations, were used to develop research capability from which complementary 
commercialisation initiatives were expected to emerge and contribute to further research 
development.  
 
Strategic planning documents also proved useful in managing researcher accountability-
autonomy tensions in the studied universities. Formal strategic plans appeared to embrace 
commercialisation while also offering protection to researcher autonomy. Both universities 
decoupled from their strategic plans certain commercialisation objectives and measures that 
threatened to constrain researcher autonomy. However, to demonstrate a credible commitment 
to the commercialisation mission, formal strategic plans linked university research priorities 
with the government’s priorities of social and economic development. Hence, while strategic 
plans were used as a decoupling mechanism to protect researcher autonomy, they also formed 
a useful bridging mechanism by appearing to conform to institutional pressures in order to 
enhance accountability relationships with government funding agencies.   
 
Parker (2011, p. 448) notes that while there may be “transitory decoupling between the ‘new’ 
formal values, strategies and processes and informally persisting ‘traditional’ versions of these, 
the absorption of the corporate and commercial into university life has been comprehensive 
and pervasive”. His argument suggests that attempts at decoupling may be failing and, as a 
result, researcher autonomy may be eroded. However, the findings of this study indicate that 
decoupling may still be an effective strategy, since the studied universities were managing to 
protect researcher autonomy while still going along with commercialisation imperatives. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
As universities are increasingly required to develop and exploit opportunities for research 
commercialisation, tensions have developed between the autonomy of researchers and the 
growing accountability demands of the commercialisation mission. Yet, little is known of the 
strategies and practices by which universities manage these tensions. Informed by NIS 
perspectives, this paper has examined how two universities have responded to 
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commercialisation pressures and has highlighted the complex nature of researcher autonomy 
and accountability relationships.  
This study extends the prior use of NIS theory in this area by addressing recent calls to 
recognise the roles of structure, institutional work and collective agency in how organisations 
manage the demands of their institutional environment. Our approach responds to Suddaby et 
al.’s (2010) appeal to examine how organizations operate as interpretive mechanisms; filtering, 
decoding, and responding to broader social and institutional pressures. This has allowed us to 
highlight differences in strategies and outcomes that cannot be explained by examining only 
the broader institutional environment and to use NIS in examining organisational heterogeneity 
and practice variation (Lounsbury, 2008). 
This study makes several contributions to the research literature in this field. It supports and 
extends prior research that has identified the tensions between researcher autonomy and the 
growing accountability demands of the commercialisation mission (Altbach, 2007; Kayrooz et 
al., 2007; OECD, 2005; Yamamoto, 2004) and addresses the prior lack of research into how 
accountability-autonomy tensions are managed. Compared to previous literature identifying a 
deteriorated researcher environment due to the commercialisation agenda (Altbach, 2007; 
Calvert, 2006; Kayrooz et al., 2007; Yamamoto, 2004), this study goes further in unpacking 
how two quite different universities attempted to strategically manage the commercialisation 
agenda and its researcher impacts. Additionally, responding to prior observations that the logics 
of basic and commercial research are incompatible (D'Este and Patel, 2007; Gulbrandsen and 
Smeby, 2005; Pettersen and Solstad, 2007), this study suggests that synergies can exist between 
pure research and commercialisation and can be harnessed via appropriate structures and 
strategies. 
In response to Parker’s (2011) observation that the applied research agenda is being internalised 
by universities, our findings suggest that this may not always be at the expense of basic research 
if appropriate strategies are used to reconcile the competing logics of researcher autonomy and 
commercialisation. Further, contrary to Parker’s (2011) conclusions that government research 
ranking metrics are becoming increasingly powerful coercive forces and that researcher 
autonomy is being eroded, this study suggests that decoupling strategies can be used to protect 
researcher autonomy in the face of commercialisation imperatives. 
In summary, this study adds to our understanding of the research management practices within 
universities by highlighting the complex nature of researcher autonomy and accountability 
relationships. It goes beyond the prior literature’s identification of the existence of 
accountability-autonomy tensions to reveal strategies by which universities have sought to 
manage these tensions. Furthermore, these case studies reveal differing organisational change 
outcomes despite a shared institutional environment and similar managerial responses, 
suggesting the likely influence of organisational history, context and values. Finally, this study 
points to the potential role of bridging strategies such as collaboration and partnerships in 
helping different groups of organisational actors to see their institutional logics as shared and 
complementary. 
24 
 
This study has drawn on case studies of New Zealand universities, so the findings must be 
considered in relation to its historical and institutional context and the research methods 
employed. It has also focussed upon an organisational level of analysis. As noted by Suddaby 
et al. (2010) and Lawrence et al. (2011), further insights may come from a closer examination 
of individual agency, whether that of institutional entrepreneurs or less heroic actors engaged 
in their day-to-day institutional work. In addition, future studies may usefully adopt a more 
micro-perspective to seek further insights into ongoing processes of institutionalisation within 
the management and commercialisation of university research (as per Moll et al., 2006; Ribeiro 
and Scapens, 2006; Suddaby, 2010). 
The findings of this study raise important issues for stakeholders in university research. In 
particular, policies concerning research funding, management and commercialisation need to 
recognise the tensions and provide conditions and incentives to help manage them. Our study 
points to some potentially useful strategies for doing so. Policymakers may better develop 
research commercialisation by supporting it with corresponding resources and performance 
benchmarks. In dealing with commercialisation, researchers should be encouraged to recognise 
the complementarity of the research and commercialisation logics. Furthermore, university 
managers may benefit from emphasising research capability development alongside their 
commercialisation objectives. While the adoption of symbolic systems may enhance 
legitimacy, failure to implement material practices and provide the appropriate cultural context 
to manage conflicting relationships may place university commercialisation ambitions at risk. 
Finally, for society, to fully exploit the potential economic and social benefits of research being 
carried out in universities, commercialisable research should be encouraged alongside basic 
research with serious attention paid to managing the associated tensions that may arise.   
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APPENDIX 1: ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
The following list provides the key documents analysed and the period covered. Confidential 
documents are not included in the list. 
 
 
Document Type 
 
Period Covered 
Number of 
Documents 
 
Institution 
Annual Reports 2002-2008 7 Premier 
Annual Reports 2002-2009 8 Universal 
Strategic Plan 2005-2012 1 Premier 
Strategic Plan 2002-2004 1 Premier 
Strategic Plan 2007-2011 1 Universal 
Investment Plan 2008-2011 1 Universal 
Investment Plan 2015-2017 1 Universal 
Profile 2009-2010 1 Premier 
Profile 2008 1 Premier 
Summary Profile 2008-2010 1 Premier 
Charter (Updated) 2005 1 Universal 
Charter 2003  1 Premier 
Operational Priorities 2004-5 2 Premier 
Academic Audit Portfolio 2006 1 Universal 
Profile (Parts a, b &c) 2005 2 Premier 
Profile (Parts a, b &c) 2006-2008 2 Premier 
Profile  2007 1 Premier 
Profile 2007-2008 1 Premier 
Academic Audit Report  2008-2012 1 Premier 
Research Newsletters 2004-2009 Various Universal 
Research Policy Manual  2009 1 Premier 
PBRF Evaluation 2006 1 Premier 
Web-pages 2004-2010 Various Universal 
Web-pages 2004-2010 Various Premier 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEWS 
For the purposes of confidentiality, the following list does not contain details sufficient to 
identify any interviewee. 
 
Interviewee Position Affiliation Date 
CEC-P CEO, Commercialisation Premier 25 Sept 08 
CEC-U CEO and Director, Commercialisation Universal 16 April 08 
CES-C CEO, Spin-off Company Spin-off  Company 17 Sept 08 
DRC-P Director, Commercialisation  Premier 30 Sept 08 
BMC-P Business Manager, Commercialisation Premier 22 Mar 08 
CMG-U Commercialisation Manager Universal 22 Jan 08 
DDI-P Deputy Director, Research Institute 1 Premier 24 June 08 
ID2-P Director, Research Institute 2 Premier 22 July 08 
ID1-U Director, Research Institute 1 Universal 15 June 09 
ID2-U Director, Research Institute 2 Universal 28 May 09 
ID3-U Director Research Institute 3 Universal 17 Sept 08 
IM-TEC Investment Manager, Tertiary Institutions Tertiary Education 
Commission 
11 Dec 07 
MTP-G Manager, Tertiary Policy  Ministry of Education 11 Dec 07 
MPR-G Manager, Tertiary Performance & Research Ministry of Education 11 Dec 07 
DRF-P Director, Finance Premier 7 Oct 08 
DRP-P Director, Planning Premier 7 Oct 08 
DPL-U Director , Policy Universal 29 Feb 08 
FFM-U Faculty Finance Manager Universal 19 Aug 08 
GMF-U General Manager & Finance Director Universal 5 Aug 08 
DRP-U Director Planning Universal 1 Oct 08 
RS1-P Research scientist Premier 24 June 08 
RS2-P Researcher & Professor Premier 22 July 08 
RS3-P Researcher 3  Premier 24 June 08 
RS4-P Researcher 4 Premier 24 June 08 
RS1-U Researcher & Professor Universal 15 June 09 
RS2-U Researcher & Professor Universal 28 May 09 
RS3-U Researcher Universal 10 Dec 07 
RPS-U Research Professor/Scientist Universal 17 Sept 08 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEWEE CODES 
 
Interviewee* Position 
CEC-P CEO, Commercialisation 
CEC-U CEO and Director, Commercialisation 
CES-C CEO, Spin-off Company 
DRC-P Director, Commercialisation  
BMC-P Business Manager, Commercialisation 
CMG-U Commercialisation Manager 
DDI-P Deputy Director, Research Institute 1 
ID2-P Director, Research Institute 2 
ID1-U; ID2-U; ID3-U Directors, Research Institutes 1, 2 & 3 
IM-TEC Investment Manager, Tertiary Institutions, Tertiary Education Commission 
MTP-G Manager, Tertiary Policy, Government Ministry of Education 
MPR-G Manager, Tertiary Performance & Research, Government Ministry of Education 
DRF-P Director, Finance 
DRP-P Director, Planning 
DPL-U Director , Policy 
FFM-U Faculty Finance Manager 
GMF-U General Manager & Finance Director 
DRP-U Director Planning 
RS1-P Research scientist 
RS2-P Researcher & Professor 
RS3-P; RS4-P Researchers 3 and 4 
RS1-U; RS2-U Researchers & Professors 1 and 2 
RS3-U Researcher 
RPS-U Research Professor/Scientist 
 
Note: -P and -U indicate Premier and Universal 
 
 
